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ABSTRACT
Surveydata on interest rate expectations are used to separat.e the forward interest rate
into an expected future rate and a term premium. These coinponent.s are used to test
separately two competing alternative hypotheses in t.est.s of the term structure: that
the expectations hypothesis does not hold, and that expected future long rates over- or
underreact. to changes in short rates. While the spread consistently fails to predict future
interest rate changes, we find that the nature of this failure is different, for short versus
long maturities. For short maturities, expected future rates are rational forecasts. The
poor predictions of the spread can therefore be at.trihut.ed to variation in term premia.
For 'onger-term bonds, however, we are unable t.o reject the expectations theory, in that
a steeper yield curve reflects a one-for-one increase in expected future long rates. Here
the perverse predictions of the spread reflect investors' failure to raise sufficiently their
expectations of future long rates when the short rate rises. We confirm earlier findings
that. bond rates underreact to short. rate changes, but now this result. cannot. be attributed
to the term premium.
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If the attractiveness of an economic hypothesis is measured by the number of papers which
statistically reject it, the expectations theory of the term st.nicture is a knockout. Only a small
fraction of the many tests beginning with Macaulay (1938) have found strong evidence in support
of the expectations hypothesis, and even fewer can reject statistically the alternative hypothesis
that the spread between long- and short-term interest rates has no predictive power at all for future
interest rate changes.' Confoundingly, the most common finding ill U.S. postwar data has been
that when short-term rates rise relative to long-term rates, future long-term rates tend to rise even
further. That is, the expectations hypothesis does worse than even the naive model that subsequent
interest rate changes are always zero.2'3
Naturally, the null hypothesis in these tests is a joint hypothesis: that all of the variability in
the spread between long- and short-term interest rates is attributable to expected future interest
'It is not quite a misnomer to speak of the expectations hypothesis. To be sure, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981) show
that different interpretations of the expectations hypothesis are mutually inconsistent, and that. one vari*nt (the yield.to.
maturity expectations hypothesis) is inconsistert with equilibrium in discrete time. Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983)
and Campbell (1986), however, derive linearizations 0f the expectations hypothesis which resolve respectively the problems of
mutual inconsistency and of consistency with equilibrium. When referring to the term structure, I have in mind the discrete-time
linearization of Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983). See section 3 below for further details.
21n their recent study of the term structure, Campbell, Shiller and Schoenholt.z remark that the resiliency of the expectations
hypothesis reminds them of Jerry in the Tom and Jerry cartoons. I tend to think of Alan Blinder's "Joe Palooka effect" (applied
originally to the rapid U.S. recovery from the 1982 recession). Each time inflatable Joe is knocked to the ground, he bounccs
energetically back, unharmed and grinning.
5Among the many studies which reject the expectations theory in U.S.postwardata are Shiller (1979), Fama (1984a, b),
Manlciw (1986), Mankiw and Summers (1984), Mankiw andMiron (1986, 1987), Modigliani and Shiller (1973), Friedm*n (1979),
Jones and Roley (1983), Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983) and Campbell and Shiller (1984, 1987). Fama (1984a), tests
the expectations hypothesis at the extreme short. end of the spectrum (using one-month bills) and finds that the spread has
some positive predictive power for future interest rate changes. Mankiw and Miron (1986) also discover evidence of the spread's
predictive power, but only as recently as 1890.1915. Nevertheless, both of these papers statistically reject restrictions imposed
by the expectations hypothesis. Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Fama and Bliss (1987) find that mediumS and long-term
spreads have positive predictive power for short rate changes further into the future. While this could be an implicationof
the expectations theory, it is also an implication of many other models in which short. rates and term premia follow a jointly
stationary stochastic process. Shilier (1981), presents the strongest. evidence in support of the expectations hypothesis. He
finds not only that the spread has statistically significant. predictive power for excess returns on five year bonds, but also that
his data cannot reject the expectations theory. Shiller (1987) provides a complete survey of th literature.
1rate changes, and that expectations are rational. Without. additional information, it is obviously
not possible to conclude either the extent to which each of these maintained hypotheses fails, or the
extent. to which each is qualitatively responsible for the perverse predictions of the yield curve. One
consequence of this ambiguity is that authors tend to attribute the sourcesof predictable excess
returns on long rates in accordance with their own priors. Some argue that time-varying term
premia are responsible for the rejection, while others suggest. that. over- or under-reaction of long
rates (relative to what is rational) may be driving the results.
More recently, Mankiw and Miron (1986), Mankiw and Siunmers (1984) and Starts (1982)
have suggested that the poor performance of the expectations theory can be interpreted not only
as evidence of a time-varying term premium, but also as evidence that the premium is more
variable than are expected future changes in short-term interest, rates. Such an interpretation
implies that observed changes in the spread are attributable primarily t.o variat.ion in risk. This
view follows directly under rational expectations from two siniple facts: first, that the spread
does change over time (when the short rate rises, the spread tends to fall), and second, that
short-term interest rates are close to a random walk on levels. That this random-walk" view
emerges from such simple descriptive statistics is powerful evidence that. recent. findingsof bias
in the long rate's predictions of future short rates are robust to the precise period and statistical
methodology used to test the expectations theory. Indeed, the view that the variation in forward
premia predominantly reflects risk has already been articulated in the context of a variety of
asset markets. For example, variation is regularly observed in forward and future discounts in
foreign exchange and nonagricultural commodity markets, but this variation does not help explain
subsequent spot price changes.4
Nevertheless, the notion that large and highly variable term premia are responsible for the
failure of the expectations hypot.hesis, particularly at the very short cud of Lime maturity spectruni,
is unappealing to many observers. Thus Shiller (1981), Campbell. Shiller andSchoenholts(1983),
Campbell and Shiller (1984) and Mankiw and Summers (1984) have suggested that the apparent
4}Iodrick and Srivastava (1984, 1986a, h), present. evidcnce that forward and future exchange rates are biased predictors of
future spot exdiange rates and interpret thistomean that the variance of the foreign exchange risk premium is greater than
the variance of expected depreciation. For an alternative interpretation see Froot and Fmankel (1986). They employ survey
data in a manner analogous to the current. paper in order to determine the importance of risk premia and expectational errors
in explaining bias in the forward exchange rate. Fama and French (1986) present. evidence that variation in several commodity
future discounts primarily reflects variation in risk.
2faiures of the expectations hypothesis might be explained instead by myopic expectations, which
provoke an overreaction in bond prices to changes in short-term interest rates. Their tests, however,
support the opposite conclusion that long-term rates underreact to short. rate changes. Indeed, if
one eschews explanations based on a time-varying term premilun. the iujderreact.ion hypothesis
follows directly from the two empirical facts above. Under the expectations theory, long rates
should move one-for-one with short. rates which follow a random walk. Because they have a smaller
variance than short rates, long rates must underreact.
Put baldly, we have no way of choosing between these alternatives; we do not know how
variable the term premium is, nor have we a sense for how reliable the expectations imbedded in
long rates are. In this paper we extract information from surveys of interest. rate expectations in
an effort to resolve these basic issues. These relatively new dat.a sources allow us to determine both
qualitatively and statistically the extent to which expectational errors and the term premium are
each responsible for the biased predictions of the spread. Indeed, our results indicate a striking
difference in the importance of these two explanations both at opposite ends of the maturity
spectrum and across the term structures of different coimtries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly describes the data and their coverage,
and discusses the interpretation we give to the survey responses. In Section 2 we briefly review the
linearized model of the term structure. The standard test of whether the spread is an unbiased
predictor of future interest rate changes is performed in section 3. This is the most. common method
of testing the expectations hypothesis. The reported deviation from the null hypothesis is separated
in section 4 into a component attributable to a failure of the expectations theory and a component
attributable to systematic expectational errors. Section 5 then uses the surveys to determine the
extent to which the first part of the joint hypothesis -.thatthe survey expectations themselves
conform to the expectations theory —failsin the standard test.. In other words, we use the survey
data to test directly the expectations hypothesis. Section 6 tests for the significance of the second
component in the failure of the joint hypothesis: systematic expect.ational errors. Here we use the
surveys to explore the hypotheses that forecasted interest rate changes are excessively volatile and
that future interest rates tend to over- or underreact to contemporaneous short. rate changes. In
section 7, we present some simple but revealing statistics from the surveys to clarify the role of the
3term premium in the pricing of bills and bonds. Section 8 concludes.
1. The Data
Three sources of survey data on future interest rate expectations are used in this paper.The
first survey is conducted by the Gold8mith-Nagan Morzey Market Letter, which has recently merged
with the investor newsletter, Reporting on Government8, and adopted itsname.5 At the end of each
quarter from mid-1969 to the end of 1986, Goldsinith-Nagan (GN)has surveyed financial market
participants on their expectations of interest rates on 3 month Treasury Bills,3 month Eurodollar
deposits, 12 month Treasury Bills, the return on the Buyer bond index,6and the 30 year mortgage
rate.7 Each respondent. is asked to give his or her expectation of the level of each of these rates in 3
and 6 months time. The duration and consistency of this set. of surveys --currently,70 contiguous
quarters of data for a variety of instruments —ishighly uxmsual.
The second survey source is Money Market Services, Inc (MMS), which conducts weekly and
biweekly surveys of interest rates. While the coverage of these data is far morelimited than the
Goldsmith-Nagan surveys, they are helpful in providing breath. In London, every twoweeks from
the beginning of 1983 until October 1984, MMS canvassed 30 traders on the Euromarket deskof
various banks for their expectations on the level of 3 month Eurodollar, EuroDM, Europoundand
Euroyen deposits in 3 months time. In Sydney Australia from mid-1985 to early 1987,MMS asked
bank traders on a weekly basis their expectations of 10 year bonds in one month'stime.8
While most economists distrust survey data, probably few would argue with the statement that,
used correctly, surveys can potentially add to our understanding of the behavior of expectations.
Surveys of interest rate expectations are especially appealing, since they permitdirect. measurement
of bot.h the expected future short-term interest rate and the associated term premium. Nevertheless,
skeptics rightfully argue that it is hard to accept that a collection of relativelycareless verbal
responses, even from informed market participants, canbe identified directly with the market
expectation.9
'Fziedman (1979, 1980) were the first papers to use data from these surveys.
6Thls is an index of 20 general obligation issues with 20 year maturities. The index ic designed to reflect. current yield-to.
maturity on new issue quotes.
7Mortgage instruments carry "put." options, which distort their duration and risic diaracteristics. Existing mortgageswhich
were granted at rates higher than those prevailing are often refinanced, denying creditors the capital gains theywould otherwise
earn if prep'ment was not allowed.
5Actual daily interest rates were obtained from DRI when available, and otherwise from the WallStreetJournal and the
London Financial Times.
One could also question the existence of a unique market expectation when agents have disparate beliefs. SeeRubinctein
4The tests performed in this paper do not. assume that the median survey response is equivalent
to the market. expectation. Instead, we think of the surveys as being subject. to the same kinds of
problems inherent in any single proxy for "the" market expectation. Whateverthe proxy, call it
x, it. can be represented by the equation:
(.(k—J))e— +(1j (1)
where (/))erepresentsthe markets' (unobservable) expectation at time t of the interest rate on
a k —jperiod bill issued in period t + j,j) isthe current "short-term" interest, rate on jperiod
bills, and qj is a residual term.
There are several choices for z1, each of which implies a corresponding residual. One possibility
is to define the forward interest, rate less the short rate as z1, which implies the error term, q,1, is
identified with the forward term premium. Of course, if the point is to tc5t for the presence of a
term premium, this formulation is merely a definition of the alternative hypothesis.
The second and most common choice for z1 is the change in the actual realized interest, rate at
time t + , — Thenthe residual term is the ex poRt expect.ational error, usually attributed
to "news". The disadvantage to conscripting i1 to be a proxy for the market expect.ationis that
we wish to test separately the hypothesis that the expectational errors arein fact. conditionally
independent of (J))e. Learningon the part of the market. in response to noustationarities or
process switching, irrational behavior, and "peso problems"i11 which a low probability event does
not occur a representative number of times in the sample, would all lead tosmall sample failures
of conditional independence.
The third candidate for z1 is the median survey expectation, which we denot.e by In this
case, qj is identified with measurement errorin the survey data. This error arises from factors such
as imperfect synchronization of participants responses, high volatilityof interest rates, and the use
of a median response elicited from a small fraction of the population of market. participants.Just as
in the foregoing case of ex poRt prediction errors, the measurement error here must.be conditionally
independent of the market expectation to permit us to draw reliableinferences. However, now
the properties of the error term will be immune t.o the effects of learning, irrationality, or peso
problems.
(1974) for conditiou under which agent. expectations can he icceftiIl ag r'giteil into t,hr expct.ationof a welI.defined
representative agent..
52. The Model
Throughout. the paper, we adopt. the linearized model of the term structure of Shiller, Campbell
and Schoenholtz (1983). While this model employs oniy approximations to actual forward rates
and holding period returns, it has several properties that. are useful for our purposes. First, as noted
in the introduction, such a linearization resolves any ambiguities which arise when choosing among
alternative definitions of the expectations hypothesis. Second, there are a bewildering variety of
ways to test. the implications of the expectations hypothesis.With the linearized model, however,
we can test a single specification and draw implications for the many other specificationsfound in
the literature. This is important since one of our ol)jectiVes is t.o use the surveys to help explain
prior findings. Third, the linearization appears to sacrifice relatively little accuracy in comparison
with nonlinear models.1°
Under this model, the current long rate is a weighted average of expected future short rates:
k/j—1
.(k)..._i 'ç—jl.(J)e —'-'kL..d' -t+i!1
1=0
where y = (1 + i)' is the discount. factor, and Dk is Macaulay's (1938) definition of duration for
this k period bond when priced at par:
- (3
1 —(1+ )_1
where is the coupon rate. Pure discount bonds, such as the Treasury hills we analyze have a zero
coupon, so that their duration is just the time to maturity.'1
Given the model in equation (2), a linearized approximation to the forward interest rate at




Theterm premium on a k period bond from period ttoperiod t+ jis then defined as the difference
between the forward rate and the expected future spot rate:
f(Jk_J)1.(k—j)e —0U,k—i) 5 —lI+i I —I
'0Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholfz (1983) present. evidence that. the linearized forward rates are close t.o the true forward
rates, particularly over the relatively short forecast. horizons considered in the present, paper. Campbell (1988) demonstrates
the accuracy of the linearization in continuous time.
For the longer-term bonds investigated below, we approximate the coupon rate on rcli instrument by assuming it. is equal
to that instrument's average return over the sample period.
6Thus the expectations hypothesis implies that =0.i.e., that forward rates are equal to
expected future spot rates. The expected holding-period yield is the expected yield obtained from






From equations (2), (4) and (6) the excess holding-period return on a k period bond held for j
periodsis proportional to the risk premium defined in equation (5):
'D'\1(h(J)e.(j) —0(J,kJ) f(J.k_J)1.(k—j)e 7
J 1g — — k--J I
Inthis linearized model of the term stnicture, the expectations hypothesis implies 1)0th that ex-
pected excess returns on long-term bonds are zero and that. forward rates are equal to expected
future spot rates.
3. A Standard Test of the Expectations Hypothesis
There are a myriad of testable implications which follow from the model in section 2. Our first
task is to choose a method of testing the term structure which best facilitates comparison with a
variety of earlier work. Consider one standard regression test of the expectations hypothesis, in
whirh the subsequent. change in the short rate is regressed on the forward premium:'2
•(kj)•(i) atr(1,1)•(i)
1tj— — a+ —1 ,+ /tj
The restrictions imposed jointly by the expectations hypothesis and rational expectations are that
a =0,=1,and the residual term reflects purely random "news." Because the null hypothesis
imposes conditional independence of the residual, OLS can be use(1 to estimate equation (8).
Of course, many studies do not test equation (8) itself. Often either the change in the long-
term rate or the realized excess holding return is used as the dependent variable, and the spread
or the forward premium above the long-term rate is used as the regressor.Given the model in
equations (2), (4) and (6),thesetests are exactly equivalent. To demonstrate this, Table 1 presents
a complete set 'of univariate regression tests of the expectations hypothesis. Thetable is set up as a
'2Famz and BUss (1987) study the forecast. power of the spread for spot rate chauge furt.hc'r into the future.
7Chinese Menu of term structure regressions: a researcher chooses one from column A and regresses
it on one from column B.13
From the linearized model in equation (4), the elements in column B are algebraically iden-
tical. Under the linearized model of the term structure, all of the elements in column A can be
obtained from Al by adding or subtracting multiples of the elements in column B. Thus all possible
permutations yield regressions which are statistically identical. We use the particular formulation
in equation (8) —aregression of Al on B2 —becausethe null hypothesis of a =0,fi= 1does
not depend on the particular maturity, k —j, orforecast horizon, j,chosen.This turns out to be
convenient since the surveys cover a diverse set of maturities. Suppose, for example, one were to
regress A2 on either Bi or B3. These are the morefamiliar formulations in the literature for tests
of the expectations hypothesis at longer maturities. Using Table 1, the estimated coefficients in
these regressions would be
Dk—DI
— 1and 1 + (— l)Dk/DJ,respectively, whereis the OLS
estimate of equation (8).
Most tests of equation (8), or equivalently, tests using an element from column A and an
element from column B in Table 1, find thatis less than one in U.S. data. Frequently, for shorter
maturities the coefficient fiisnot statistically different from zero, so that the forward premium
is of no help in forecasting future changes in the short rate. Indeed, it is not unusual to find a
coefficient less than zero, which implies that an optimal predictor actually places negative weight
on the forward rate.
One alternative hypothesis to explain these findings is the existence of a time-varying term
premium. Under this alternative, the probability limit of the coefficient ficanbe written:
—(i) 8(J.kJ)) +var((iJhIe —LU)) = var(f"
—jW)
(9)
Clearly, if all of the variability in the spread reflects variation in expected interest rate changes,
•.(j) . .
(i,+ ) — i,,will be equal to one. At the opposite extreme, the finding that =0would imply
that all of the variation in the yield curve can be attributed to variation in term premia. To see
1n terms of Table 1: Mankiw and Summers (1984) regress A2 on BI; Shillr, Campbell and Scboenholtz (1983) regress
Al on B2 and A2 on B3; Mankiw and Miron (198(1, 1987) regress Al on Bi; Fama (1984) regresses Al on B2 and A4 onB2;
Campbell and Sbiller (1984) regress A4 on Bi; Shillr regresses A2 on B3, and so on.
8this, note that can be equivalently written:
cov((i') (i) 9(1k_I)) + var(O'''1) =—
— W)
(10)
Several authors, including St.artz (1982) and Mankiw and Miron (1986), appear to endorse this
extreme hypothesis that all of the fluctuations in the yield curve are unrelated to changes in
interest rate expectations, and reflect instead variation in term premia. Other authors find such
an alternative somewhat unattractive because it is hard to understand where all the variation in
risk would come from, especially at the very short end of the maturity spectrum. One could take
the view mentioned in Mankiw and Miron (1986) that, if interest rate expectations are static (by
which we mean (J))r —= 0),even a small amcnmt of variation in the term premium would
lead to strong rejections of the theory. But this explanation gets the expectations hypothesis off
the hook only if one is willing to accept. that changes in the slope of the yield curve have little
economic significance.
A second alternative hypothesis holds that systematic expect.ational errors in the sample period
are responsible for the well-established deviations from the iiiill hypothesis. ShiUer (1981), Shiller,
Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983), and Mankiw and Summers (1984) investigate explicitly this
alternative. All three papers consider the possibility that. irrational expectations are manifest in
the overreaction of long-term bond prices to changes in short. rates. If we interpret the market's
expectation of future short rates to be the mathematical expectation in equation (2), one version
of the overreaction hypothesis implies that the parameter y is too large, so that the market places
too much weight on current. short rates relative to what. is rational. As mentioned earlier, these
papers find no evidence in favor of the overreaction hypotliesis indeed, because fiisalways less
than one, the data consistently support the opposite conclusion that long-terni bond prices move
too little. Many observers find this second alternative as unappealing as the first because it involves
a failure of markets to be fully rational. But even those who express sympathy with the view that
expectational errors are systematic find implausible the hypothesis that bond prices do not vary
enough.
3.1. The Results
Tables 2a and 2b present estimates of equation (8) using the ex poetinterest,rates,
realised jperiodsafter the surveys were conducted. These are our standard tests of the term
9structure. Table 2a summarizes estimates for the sample corresponding to the Goldsmit.h-Nagan
survey dates, while Table 2h does the same for the MMS surveydates. In terms of our notation,
the time to maturity of each financial instrument, in Tables 2a and 21) is given l)y j— k,and the
forecast horizon is given by j.Foreach forecast horizon, inst.niments are listed in order of increasing
duration. Note that for the Goldsmith-Nagan data, both 3 and 6 month forecast horizons are
estimated for most of the assets. Before discussing the parameter estimates we pause briefly to
clarify several econometric issues.
Regressions in all of the tables that follow are estimated using OLS, with standard errors
calculated using Hansen's (1982) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Each of the surveys
was conducted regularly at a time interval smaller than the longest forecast 110r17,o11. The resulting
overlap in forecasts implies that even under the null hypothesis, the residuals will follow a moving
average process. Our estimated standard errors and F-statistics accountfor this type of serial
correlation. Using a technique due to Newey and West (1985), we also correct for the possibility
that. the estimated covariance matrixes will not he positive definite. This estimator discounts the
lth order autocovariance by 1 —(/(in +1). As the sample 5i7,C tends to infinity, incanbe any
fixed integer. But for any given finite sample, it is an open question as to how small inmustbe
in order t.o guarantee a positive definite covariance matrix, hi most of the upcoming regressions
we used m= 2P,where P is the order of the MA process of the residuals. This yields slightly
larger standard errors than those obtained by sett.ing rn= P,which Newey and West (1985) show
to guarantee positive definiteness in any finite sample.
in addition, the null hypothesis does not. imply that the residuals will be hornoskedastic.
For each of the regressions reported in the following tables. White (1980) t.ests for conditional
heteroskedasticity were performed. As one might. expect, sonic of the regressions contained resid-
uals for which the hypothesis of conditional homoskedasticity could 1)e rejected, and others did
not. When the results on heteroskedasticity are mixed in this way, three reporting strategies are
available. The first would he to report for all of the regressions the standard errors that are
consistent. only under homoskedasticity. This strategy seems undesirable since several data sct
showed evidence of severe conditional heteroskedasticity. A second strategy would be to report
only heteroskedasticity-consisten-t standard errors. The case for this approach would appear to
10be the strongest becausetheresulting standard errors will be asymptotically consistent regardless
of whether conditional het.eroskedasticit.y is present. Evidence in Froot (1987a), however, shows
that this CMM estimator is severely downward biased in sinai! samples. We therefore pursue a
third strategy of reporting both sets of standard errors (along with bOth sets of t-statistics and
F-statistics), and conduct inference based on the larger of the two. This seems to be the most
cautious approach given the small sample problems with these covariance matrix estimators.'4
All of the regressions below were estimated with constant. terms, which we do not. report to save
space. For the Goldsmith-Nagan surveys dates, which n.m from the third quarter of 1969 to the last
quarter of 1986, a slope-parameter dummy, $,isincluded in all the regressions during 1980 when
the Fed was changing operating procedures and Jimmy Carter's temporary Special Credit Restraint
Program was announced, put in place, and then dismantled. In addition, we t.ried splitting the
sample into pre- and post-1979 subsamples (based on the change in Fed operating procedures), but
we could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients were equal in the two subsamples.
Turning to the results, Tables 2a and 2b tell a familiar story. All of the point estimates of fiin
Table 2a are less than one, and all but one are significantly less. For the shorter-term 3 month and
12 month bills the parameter estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero, so that we are
unable to reject the hypothesis that the spread is of no use in forecasting future changes in short
rates. At the 6 month forecast horizon, the point estimates for these shorter-term instruments are
actually negative.
In the case of the two longer-term instruments in Table 2a, the Buyer Bond index and the
rate on 30 year mortgages, the coefficient. estimates are significantly different from both zero and
one. At these longer maturities, it is not surprising to find that. the spread has predictive power
for differences between tomorrow's long rate and t.oday's short rate. Nevertheless, this predictive
power should not be interpreted as providing support for the expectations hypothesis.Consider
the usual tests of the expectations hypothesis at longer maturities, whirl, asks the spread to predict
the upcoming change in the long rate:
.(k—j)—.(k)= + f3(.(k) —(i))+ /1.l.j. (11)
'40f course, the heteroskedasticit*'-correct.ed standard errors should be smaller than those computed assuming homoskedastic-
ityifthe second moment of the residual is negatively correlated with the second moment of the regressors. It seems implausible
that in the regressions below the variance of the residuals is systematically low when the spread is large. Our reporting strategy
therefore reflects a prior belief that smaller heteros1cedasticil'.consistent, standard errors arc snore likely to be the result of
finite-sample bias than an indicator of the true behavior of the residuals and regressors.
11where from Table 1 the null hypothesis is that , =Df/(Dk
— anumber slightly greater than
zero. Even though may be significantly greater than zero, flcanstill have the wrong sign. For
the case of the Buyer Bond index at the six month forecast horizon, /9 =_____ — 1=(0.6355
xl.0500) —1 =—0.3322with a standard error of O748k= 0.0748x1.0426=0.0786.The finding
that thissignificantly less than zero shows that the slope of the yield curve systematically predicts
in the wrong direction the future change in the long rate. This finding is almost. universal in tests of
long maturities on U.S. post-war data. The point here is that estimates of which are statistically
less than one, yet also statistically greater than zero, still provide a strong qualitative rejection of
the expectations hypothesis.
Interestingly, the credit controls dummy term, fl,showsthat. the spread does have additional
positive predictive power when a preannounced, temporary (and large) change in monetary policy
takes place. This is reminiscent of t.he finding in Mankiw and Miron (1986) that the spread had
predictive power for future short rate changes arotmd the turn of the century when there were large
seasonal fluctuations in short rates.
Table 2b contains estimates of equation (8) for interest rates of a variety of countries. For the
shorter-term 3 month Eurocd's of the dollar, DM, pound and yen, there is only mixed evidence
against the null hypothesis.'5 Strikingly, the hypothesis that the spread is an unbiasedforecaster
of future short. rate changes is most strongly rejected in the U.S. data. In all the other cases, the
hypothesis that the spread is of no positive value in forecasting future short rate changes,i.e. that
fi￿ 0,can be rejected. Indeed, in the case of 3 month Eiiropoimd depositsand Australian 10
year government bonds, the point estimates of fiaregreaterthanone. On the other hand, the
U.S. the point estimate is large and negative. Could it be that the expectations hypothesis fares
considerably worse in the U.S. than in other countries?
Overall the results show little support for hypothesis that. the forward rate is an unbiased
predictor of future interest rate changes —theusual finding in tests of the U.S. term structure. One
could interpret the evidence as favorable to either of the alternative hypotheses mentioned above.
Bias in the predictions of the spread could be due to a term premium which is positively correlated
with the spread, or to a failure to adjust expectations of fithire rates rapidly enough.
During the period when the !S surveys on the Eurocd's were conducted, there were no important. capita.! controls in
effect for these currencies. As a consequence, the Euromarket term structure reflected closely the term structure within each
of the country's borders.
124. Decomposition of the Standard Test
We can now use the surveys to split the deviation from the null hypothesis in Tables 2a and
21) into a term attributable t.o systematic expectational errors and a term attributable to the risk
premium. In the spirit of equation (1), we define the survey expectation as equal to the unobservable
true market expectation plus measurement. error:
(k—j) — t+j — k-J+ q,5 (12)
Similarly, the ex postrealizedspot rate is equal to the market's expectation plus a prediction error:
.(k—j) —
k't+j+ 13)
Using equation (13) to split the actual change in the interest rate into an expected change and a
prediction error, the coefficient fiinequation (8) converges in probability to:






Now ficanbe rewritten as one (the null hypothesis) plus a deviation attributable solely to the term
premium and a deviation attributable solely to systematic expectational errors:
(15)
where
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Althoughthe true market expectation and true term premium are unobservable both andflee
canl)e measured using the survey data, providing that the survey measurement. error term, ft,j,
is purely random. Clearly, iszero if the variance of the term premium is zero —thatis, if
expectations conform to the expectations hypothesis —andfliszero if expectations are rational.
Table 3 presents point estimates of the components of /9 to gain a sense for t.heir economic
significance; we test for the each component's statistical significance in the following sections.There
are several striking facts which leap out from this table. First, all of the estimatesfor flinthe U.S.
13data are negative, even though different, survey sources are used. By contrast., the estimates for the
other coi.int.ries are all positive. Note that. an estimate of fl< 0contributes to the usual finding
of /9< 1,while flee> 0actually raises the parameter /9aboveone.Thusmore t.han 100 percent
of the deviation from the expectations hypothesis in countries other t.haii the U.S. isattributable
to variation in term premia. In the U.S.,apositive portion of the deviation is attributable to
expect.ational errors.
The second striking fact to emerge from Table 3 is the different, behavior of short versus long
durations. While we rejected the unbiasedness of the spread at. all maturities, that. the estimates
of /99 are much larger for the shorter-term instruments thaim for the longer-term instruments. In
the case of the Buyer Bond index at. both the 3 and 6 month horizons, the contribution of the
term premium is to increase t.he estimate of /9aboveone. Moreover, the qualitative contribution
of fltp to the overall deviation from the null hypothesis is relatively large in comparison with the
contribution of fleeatthe shorter end of the maturity spectrum, and relatively small at the longer
end of the spectrum. Table 3 thus indicates that the qualitative importance of the term premium in
rejections of the expectations hypothesis is disproportionately large for shorter-term assets. While
risk may play an important role in the pricing of long-term bonds (see section 7 below), its economic.
importance in failures of the spread to predict forthcoming long-rate changes is small.
5. A Direct Test of the Expectations Hypothesis
We now attempt to investigate directly the first alternative hypothesis advanced in the fore-
going section: that the null hypothesis in equation (8) is rejected because of a time-varying term
premium. In terms of the decomposition of fi,wewish to test. whether the first. component is
statistically different from zero. This is most easily accomplished by regressing the survey expected
change on the forward premium:
(k—f).(i) 1.&,k—f).(j) — 1,2 +f'2'f — I,j + I2.I.j 18
Notice that equation (18) is a direct test of the expectations hypothesis, so that. the null hypothesis
is a2 0 and /92= 1.The size of t.he F-statistic testing these restrictions is a general measure of
the importance of the term premium. The error term in equation (18). P.2,f,f, can be interpreted as
random measurement error in the survey data. As a consequence, our estimate of /92isimmune to
14measurement error and reflects instead the behavior of the unobservable market expectation.
Equation (18) allows us to test a second hypothesis. From equation (16), we have that the
probability limit of the coefficient /92 is:
$2 =1— (19)
The finding that /92 is statistically indistinguishable from one is thus equivalent, to the hypothesis
that the second column in Table 3 is insignificantly different from zero. Put differently, a finding
of $2 =1implies we cannot reject. the hypothesis that the variance of the term premium is zero
(or, more precisely, that the covariance of the term premium with the forward premium is zero).
Notice also that a test. of i2 1may shed light on the presence of measurement. errors in the
returns on long-term bonds. Mankiw (1986) and Shiller (1979) consider the possibility that such
measurement error is responsible for the poor predictions of the spread. A finding of $2 =1would
suggest that this type of measurement error is unimportant.
There are two particular alternative hypotheses in equation (18) which interest us. The first
would be the hypothesis that expected interest, rate changes are static, or at least unrelated to
the level of the spread. Here the appropriate hypothesis test is $2 =0.A second, and related
hypothesis, allows for a time-varying term premium and asks whether the variance of expected
interest rate changes is equal to the variance of the term premium. For short-term instruments it
is useful to write the coefficient as:
var((iT))e — — var(i9k_J))
/92 = (k)( + 1/2 (20)
2var(f1"—
If$2is lessthan one-half, the variance of the term premium isgreaterthanthevariance of the
expectedinterest rate changes. For longer-term instruments, movements of (J)) — reveal
less about changes in expectations than movements of (h) )e —i.For these maturities it. is more
appropriatetocompare the variance of long rate changes with the variance of the term premium.
Some manipulation of equation (20) yields that:
,1.(k—j)e.(k) D(varIf+I) —i
—var1
2 =2Dk 2var(f'' —.(k))
— ) +
Thus if $2 > 1 —-, thevariance of expected long rate changes is greater than the variance of
the term premium.
155.1. Results
Tables 4a and 4b contain the estimates of equation (18). To begin, note that the Durbin-
Watson statistic in most of the regressions rejects the hypothesis that the residuals are serially
uncorrelated. Naturally, the regression parameters are still consistent in the presence of serial
correlation. In order t.o construct standard errors for Tables 4a and 41), we use the covariance matrix
estimator suggested by Newey and West (1985) to handle serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of
unknown form. Their covariance matrix estimator guarantees that the estimated covariance matrix
is positive definite by discounting the off-diagonal terms in Hansen's (1982) GMM covariance matrix
by 1 —l/(m+ 1), where rnisnow T25. The use of both homoskedastic and heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors is continued here as above.
Notice that for all of the instruments with a duration of one year or less, the coefficient 2 is
significantly less than one. Thus not. only are the corresponding estimates of i9 given in Table 3
qualitatively important deviations from unhiasedness, they are statistically significant as well. This
is strong evidence against the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the maturity spectrum.
The F-tests in the last column of each table show the overall importance of the term premium in
the survey data; in every case the size of the statistic is sufficient to permit rejection at the one
percent level.
A second feature of the estimates for shorter duration instruments in Table 4a is that without
exception the estimates of fl2 are greater than the estimates of fifromTable 2a for the U.S. data.
In other words, expectations conform more closely to the expectations hypothesis than the usual ez
po8tregressions in Table 2a reveal. This is not the case for the data from countries other than the
U.S. reported in Table 4b. Several studies have indeed found that the spread is a better predictor
of future interest rate changes in countries other than the U.S.' Tables 4a and 4b suggest that
these findings do not reflect any meaningful differences in the way expectations are formed. Table
4b indicates that the expectations theory is equally valid in the U.S.. U.K., West Germany and
Japan for short maturities. The deviations from unbiasedness observed in Tables 2a and 2b —which
at first might appear to suggest that the expectations hypothesis fares worse in the U.S. than in
other countries —mustthen be due to expectational errors.
16See, for example, Mankiw (1986).
16A third feature of the estimates of /32 for the short-term bills is that we can reject the hypothesis
that expectations are static. In all of the regressions, /92 is consistently positive and statistically
greater than zero.
Fourth, note that while expectations are not static, they vary considerably less than term
prernia for the short-term instruments: the point estimates of /92for3 and 12 month hills are
consistently small enough to conclude that the variance of the term premium is greater than the
variance of the expected change. Nevertheless, in only one of the regressions using 3 month bills
can we reject the hypothesis that the variance of the term premium is equal t.o the variance of the
expected change in short rates (i.e., /321/2).
While the shorter maturities do not provide much evidence to support the expectations hy-
pothesis, the longer maturities tell a different story. The F-tests for 2= 0.I2= 1reject for
30 year mortgages, but not for Buyer Bonds.'7 Nevertheless, all of the estimates of /32forthe
Buyer Bond index and 30 year mortgage rate are statistically indistinguishable from one at. the one
percent level. Indeed, the point estimates for the Buyer Bond index are actually greater than one.
We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that long-maturity estimates of /9t.pinTable 3 are zero.
Finally, in the longer-term U.S. instruments we cannot reject either the hypothesis that the
variance of the term premium is equal to the variance of expected long rate changes or the hypothesis
that the variance of the term premium is zero.t8
6. Tests of Rational Expectations
We now turn to the second alternative hypothesis that has bceii advanced to explain rejections
of the null hypothesis in equation (8): expectational errors. While there are many possible tests for
a systematic component to these errors, we choose only those specifirationr which provide insight
into the particular alternative hypotheses we wish to explore. More specifically. the survey data give
us a unique opportunity t.o test the over- and underreaction hypothesis directly. Shiller, Campbell
and Schoenholtz (1983), Campbell and Shiller (1984) and Mankiw and Summers (1984) tested for
overreaction, but to do so they were forced to impose the expectations theory as a maintained
-The difference in the F.st.atistics for these two instruments is due primarily to differences in the constant term, o, which in
turn is due to tax-free status of the long-term bonds in th Buyer Bond index and the prepayment. option on 30 year mortgages.
Because of these special features, one would not want to attribute differences in risk premia exclusively to duration.
'81n the case of the Buyer Bond index C month forecasts, we do reject the hypothesis that var((i7))' —=
Inthis case, I —Dj/2Dt 0.952which is 2.25 standard deviations from 1.0316. the estimate of flu.
17hypothesis.
6.1. Excessive or Insufficient Forecast Volatility?
Suppose the market's expectation of the future interest, rate i a linearcombination of the
contemporaneous short rate and an arbitrary combination of other inputs:'9
(',+ )= w1i1+ (1 —w,)x, (22)
Similarly, the actual realised interest. rat.e is assumed to be a linear combination of the same factors,
plus a stochastic news term:
w2j1 + (1 —w2)x,+ p.,.j (23)
Subtracting equation (22) from (23), and substituting for x, we have:
—(I))e= + fl3((i'r —i)+ /13,fJ (24)
where fl= 'T2.Under the null hypothesis that the market expectation is rational, a =/930,
and the residual, ispurely random.
The alternative hypothesis in equation (24) is that there is excessive or insufficient forecast
volatility, or equivalently, that expected future rates over- or underreact t.o short rate changes.
Suppose that flisgreater than sero, expectations place a greater weight on the contemporaneous
short rate than is rational. In such a case, a lower value of w1 would tend to reduce t.he mean
squared expectational error, or equivalently, would tend to raise the variance of expectedinterest
rate changes. To see this not.e that equation (20) can he rewritten:
1.(k—j)e.(j) —i .(j) ) —I,—— W1 JX1 — I,
Thus if flisnegative, expect.ed interest, rate changes are excessively volatile. Here agents could
improve their forecasts by reducing fractionally their expectations of future interest rate changes.
In this case, agents' expectations of future rates do not. move enough in response to the current
short rate: expected rates underreact to spot rate changes.2°
leThe vector 3(mayalso include contemporaneous interest rates.
'°Foot (1987h) investigates the implications of tests of exce forecast volatility for the alternative hypothesis of Shiller
(1981), that asset prices are "too" volatile.
18Tables 5a and 5b present estimates of equation (24), substituting for the market expectation,
the survey measure, In Table 5a, the point estimates ofare all less than
zero, an indication that expected interest rate changes are too volatile relative to what is rational.
The estimates for the 3 month instruments, however, are not statistically significant. There is
no evidence that agents could improve their forecasts of future short rates. At the other end of
the maturity spectrum, Table 5a provides evidence that expectations of future long rate changes
are indeed excessively volatile. This conclusion, however, does not carry over to the estimates for
Australian long-term bonds in Table 5b. Here $issignificantly positive, indicating that investors
could improve their forecasts by increasing multiplicatively their expectations of future changes in
the long-term bond rate.
There is one significant problem, however, with the regressions presented in Tables 5a and 5b.
According to equation (12), the survey data represent noisy estimates of the market's expectation.
In contrast. with all our prior regressions, which used only on the left-hand side, our estimates
of equation (24) employ the surveys on both sides. Accordingly, measurement error in the survey
data will bias 1ãtowardminus one, so that findings of )9 <0should be viewed with some
skepticism. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of excessive forecast volatility for the 3 month
instruments of Table 5a, even in the presence of measurement error.
8.2. Reaction to the Long Rate
The solution to the classic errors-in-variables problem is of course to find instruments for the
regressors which are correlated with it, but uncorrelated with the measurement error. Based on
the results presented in Tables 4a and 41), we have an obvious candidate: the forward interest rate.
We can therefore run a regression of the survey prediction error on the spread as an instrumental
variables test for the presence of excess forecast volatility:
.(k—j)(.(kj) — a14.(j.kj)•(ih — j — a4+ /4k'g — 1 ) +/L4,f,J 26
wherethe null hypothesis is again that $4=
This specification is useful in several ways. First, it allows a test of excessive forecast volatility
that is free of the trouble from measurement error. Second, it. allows us to test whether the deviation
We use OLS to estimate equation (26) instead of IV because the test of =0is imariant. to the estimation method in
this case.
19from unbiasedness attributable to expectational errors is significant. By inspection,the coefficient
flisthe second component of the deviation from the mill hypothesis inTable 3:
= (27)
We can give a third interpretation to /9i in equation (26). In section 6.1, wefound evidence that
the expected future rate reacts insufficiently to changes in 8hort rates, makingexpected interest
rate changes too volatile. We can think of equation (26) as askingwhether expected future rates
respond sufficiently to changes in the long rate. Underthis interpretation, a finding that fi< 0
implies that expected future rates react excessively toincreases in the spread. To see this, note
that by replacing xwith in equations (23) and (24) and then taking the difference we have
equation (26), with fl.= — w2.A finding that /9< 0implies that w1 is "too" small: as before,
expectations place insufficient weight on the contemporaneousshort rate. hut in addition now place
ezce8sive weight on the contemporaneous long rate. The opposite holds 11/94> 0.
Estimates of equation (26) are given in Tables 6a and 6h. The results agreeclosely those in
Tables 5a and Sb. There is substantial evidence at the longer maturitiesthat the estimates of
flfromTable 3 are highly significant. In addition, these estinates of /94confirmthe tentative
conclusion from Table 5a that expected future rate changes in the longermaturities are excessively
volatile. Expectations appear excessively sensitive to changes in long ratesfor instruments with
longer duration. Agents would do better to place more weight onthe contemporaneous short rate
and less weight on the contemporaneous long rate in forming their expectations.This finding is in
agreement with that in Mankiw and Summers (1984)afl(l Campbell and Shiller (1984), but here
the results cannot be interpreted as evidence of a term premium.
For the shorter maturities, however, expectational errors do not appear tobe at all systematic.
This finding also agrees with the results in Table 5a, which showlittle evidence of excessive or
insufficient forecast volatility at the short end of the maturity spectrum.
Table fib presents estimates of equation (26) for different countries. Among Germany,the
U.K., Japan and Australia, the U.S. appears unique inthe tendency for expectations to overreact
to changes in the spread. In these other countries, the positive pointestimates of j9indicatethat
if anything expected future rates underreact to changes in the spread.These findings (together
with those in Tables Sa, 5b and 6a) could be consistent with a belief amonginvestors that short
20term U.S. rates are asymptotically more regressive than post-war sample experience shows, while
short rates in other coimtries have turned out to be more regressive than expected.
7. Variation in the Term Premium
Our findings thusfar could be summarized as documenting the importance of term premia for
instruments of shorter duration and the unimportance of term prernia for instruments of longer du-
ration in the biased forecasts of the spread. Could it be that risk is important in pricing short-term
bills yet unimportant in the pricing of long-term bonds? In this section we ignore the restrictions
implied by expectations hypothesis and investigate the behavior of the terni premium directly. To
preview our findings, the answer to the above question is no. Risk premia become increasingly
important in pricing bonds as their duration increases.
Table 7 presents means of the data used in the foregoing tests, expressed in percent per annum.
In the first column is the spread (here the forward rate less the current short rate). Using the survey
data, we separate the spread into an expected change and a term premia, Provided that
any measurement error in the surveys is random, these means will be consistent estimates of the
true market values. In column (4) is the holding premium, h" —orthe expected excess return
from holding a kperiodbond for jperiods.Note that the holding premium generally increases
with duration: the average expected excess return to holding 6 month bills for 3 months is 0.50
percent per annum, while the average expected excess return t.o holding tax exempt 20 year Buyer
bonds for 3 months is 3.05 percent per annum.
Taken by itself, the observation that premia rise with duration is not evidence of the importance
of risk in the pricing of Long-term instruments. We would also like to see the relative variability of the
premia. We do this in two ways. First, it is interesting to see directly time actual survey premia even
though they are contaminated by measurement error. Figures 1 awl 2 display the term structure of
the premia for a 3 month holding period for several instruments in the Coldsmith-Nagan dataset. It
is clear that as duration increases, both the mean and the variability of the survey holding premium
increase dramatically. If the measurement error is roughly the same magnitude for 6 the month
bills as it is for 20 year Buyer Bonds and 30 year mortgages, then the premia for these long-term
bonds is relatively precisely measured. Even though the size of the premium for 6 month bills is
relatively small, a premium of 100 basis points (which is not unusual) on U.S. government Tbills
21still seems large in absolute terms. The surveys suggest. that. term prern rose substantially during
periods of high interest rate volatility.22
While these figures are of interest, it is possible that the variability of the measurement error
increases with duration and that. the errors are contemporaneously correlated across instruments.
To remove the measurement error we obtained the predicted values from a regression of the survey
expectation on a constant, the current short rate, and the current long rate, andthen subtracted
the forward rate to obtain the term premium. As a benchmark measure, we estimated predictable
expo8treturns on these instruments from a regression of the actual realized interest rate on the
same regressors. Two of these premia measures —6month holding premia for 9 month Tbills and
Buyer Bonds —aregraphed in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Summary measures for each asset are
reported in Table 8.
Two striking observations come out of Figures 3 and 4. First and foremost is time powerful visual
impression created by how closely the survey premium (after being purged of any measurement
error) moves with predictable excess returns for the short maturities in Figure 3. Contrastthis
with the markedly different behavior of the two series for longer maturities graphed in Figure 4.
Figure 3 implies that t.he short-maturity surveys do not tell us anything new about term premia
that. we could not have learned with expo8t realizations(though we did need the surveys to find
this out), while the long-maturity surveys differ radically from the predictable excess returns on
bonds.
The second striking fact in Figures 3 and 4 is that. the survey prelnia become substantially less
volatile than predictable excess returns as duration increases. Nevertheless, variation in the survey
premium becomes increasingly pronounced at longer maturities, even after measurement erroris
removed. In Figure 4 the survey premium is much smoother than predictable excess returns, which
exhml)it enormous swings. Changing 1)erceptions of risk are clearly an important determinant of
changes in bond prices. Nevertheless, at first glance the survey premia appear less important in
pricing long-term assets than predictable excess returns.
Table 8 evaluates the statistical significance of fluctuations in these two measures of risk premia.
For each asset we report the point, estimate for the variance and the probability that the variance is
22Naturally,it is impossible to present graphs of all the surveyseries.Little information is lost, by our selective presentation,
however, since the characteristics we mention are shared for all the data.
22equal to zero (in parentheses). The probabilities are from F-test.s that the coefficients on the long
and short rates in the regressions are jointly zero. Though the estimated variance of predictable
excess returns is often huge, we frequently cannot reject the hypothesis that. the actual variance is
zero. By contrast, we strongly reject the hypothesis that the survey premia are constant. Thus,
while risk appears more variable when extracted from excess returns, it is measured less precisely
than when extracted from the surveys.
Finally, note that the survey premia in Figures 3 and 4 appear reasonable: they are highly pos-
itively correlated with nominal interest and inflation rates. By contrast, the behavior of predictable
excess returns in Figure 4 is less easily understood.
238. Conclusions
We have used survey data on interest rate expectations to investigate the reasons whythe
spread is such a poor predictor of future interest, rate changes. Our major findings aresummarized:
(1) We confirm earlier findings that predictions of future interest, rate changes bythe spread
contain bias of a similar nature for short and long maturities. The explanations forthis bias,
however, differ markedly at opposite ends of the maturity spectrum.
(2) The surveys on short-term U.S. government securities indicatethe existence of a term
premium which is both large and variable. The failure of the spread t.o predictin an unbiased way
future short-term interest rate changes is predominantly attributable to the timevariation in this
premium. Changes in the slope of the yield curve for short. maturitiestherefore reflect changing
perceptions of risk. We use the survey data to test directly the expectations hypothesis(without
needing t.o impose the additional assumption of rational expectations)and we reject it.
(3) Conclusion (2) implies that hypotheses which attempt t.o explainthe bias in the spread at
the short end of the maturity spectrum in terms of over- or underreaction receive no supportin
our tests. There is no evidence of systematic forecasting errorsin the surveys. Our direct test. of
the overreaction hypothesis finds no evidence that expected short rate changes are excessively or
insufficiently volatile.
(4) The brightest ray of hope for the expectations theory comes from expectationsof future
long-term bond rates. The survey data show that expected bug-rate changesconform closely
with the expectations theory in the sense that an increase in the spread is reflectedin a one-
for-one increase in the expected future long rate. This fact suggests that the frequentlycited
tendency of the spread to predict long rate changes perversely caimot be explained by errorsmade
in measuring long-term rates, or by variation in term premia. Though the survey premiumremains
highly variable even after measurement errors are removed, we cannot. rejectthe hypothesis that
the true premium is uncorrelated with the spread.
24(5) Conclusion (4) implies that the inability of the spread to forecast future long rate changes
is attributable primarily to systematic expectational errors. We cannot reject the hypothesis that
the change in t.he long rate in excess of the spread is attributable exclusively to these expectational
errors. More specifically, investors overreact to changes in the spread. Their expectations are
excessively volatile, in that they would do better by moving their forecasts of the future long-rate
in the direction of the contemporaneous short rate. Long rates, which under the expectations
theory are a weighted average of expected future short rates, underreact to contemporaneous short
rate changes. Mankiw and Summers (1984) and Campbell and Shiller (1984) also interpreted their
results as evidence that long rates underreact; otir evidence suggests that this result can no longer
be attributed to the term premium.
(6) We also present evidence that expectations formation is very similar across countries.
While the spread predicts future interest changes more poorly in the U.S. than in other countries,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that this effect is attributable entirely to differences in the nature
of expectational errors in the U.S. versus several other countries. The unique tendency for expected
U.S. long rates to overreact to changes in the spread may be an indication that investors do not
believe U.S. short rates are nearly nonstationary, as the post-war sample alone might lead one to
conclude.
(7) Perceptions of risk tend to become increasingly important in the pricing of bonds as dura-
tion increases. We document large and statistically significant swings in term premia on long-term
bonds, and substantially smaller (but nevertheless significant) swings on short-term bills. Investor
perceptions of the risks of holding long-term bonds appear much smoother than the predictable
component of realized excess returns, but are measured much more precisely. hi contrast to the
behavior of predictable excess returns, these premia appear to be large when nominal interest and
inflation rates are high.
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28Thble 1
A C1ete Set of Tests of
The Fectations Hypothesis for
a Linearized Plodel
Co1*n A Co1i B
Dependent Variable Independent Variable
(1) - (1)
Dk D
(2) -i (2) -
(3) -fk-J (3)k (f.k_J-i)
(4) -i
(5) h' -iTable 2a
Tests of the TernStructure oftheU.S.
OLSRegressionsof
-i







Horizon t DP .=O
(j)
3 Month 1969-1986 3 PIns 0.0592_3.616*** 4.97372.06 .35 67 14.37***
T Bill quarterly (0.2602) _3.925*** (0.8679) 14.64***
(0.2397) (1.1277)
3 Month 1969-1978 3 PIns 0.4267_1.817* NA 1.89.02 33555***
Euro Dollar quarterly (0.3155) -1.209 3.28*
(0.4744)
12Month 1969-1986 3 PIns 0.2909_4.134*** 2.05422.13 .27 67 19.73***
T Bill quarterly (0.1715) _2.939*** (0.4861) 23.31***
(0.2412) (0.9818)
Buyer Bond1969-1986 3 PIns 0.8342_3•497*** 0.15762.37 .87 674.09**
Index quarterly (0.0474) _3.988*** (0.0927) 5.31***
(0.0416) (0.2200)
30 Year 1969-1986 3 PIns 0.7568 _3.523*** 0.42092.74 .69 676.58***
IIortaaçesquarterly (0.0690) _2.208** (0.1275) 5.26***
(0.1101) (0.2193)
3 Month 1969-1986 6 PIns -0.3626_4.071*** 0.92841.79 .01 66 15.04***
T Bill quarterly (0.3347) _4.460*** (0.7482) 13.32***
(0.3055) (1.7105)
12 Month 1969-1986 6 PIns -0.1219_5374*** 2.34561.51 .18 66 22.29***
T Bill quarterly (0.2088) _4•755*** (0.5963) 20.93***
(0.2360) (0.8378)
BuyerBond1969-1986 6 PIns 0.6355_5.127*** 0.29461.29 .71 668.85***
Index quarterly (0.0711) _4.875*** (0.1317) 9.03***
(0.0748) (0.0984)
30Year 1969-1986 6 PIns 0.5680_4.819*** 0.43551.53 .47 669.15***
Plortaaaesquarterly (0.0897) _4.614*** (0.1552) 11.58***
(0.0936) (0.1261)
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using GPQI undertheassumptionof
homoskedasticity andalsoallowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.
*** ***?tE2b












tINS -0.9269 _2.469** 0.15.04 454.72**
3Month Euro $ 1/83-10/84 3 tIns (0.7815) _6.858*** 24.43***
biweekly (0.2813)
West Germany 1*15 0.4378 _2.301** 0.64.09 45 11.95***
3 Month Euro Thu 1/83-10/84 3 tIns (0.2443) _3.038*** 11.88***
biweekly (0.1851)
England 1*15 1.5581 1.312 0.82.30 452.28
3 Month Euro Pound 1/83-10/84 3 tIns (0.4255) 0.949 14.23***
biweekly (0.5881)
JaDan tINS 0.5123 _2.160** 0.59.13 453.24**
3 Month Euro Yen 1/83-10/84 3 tIns (0.2258) _3•449*** 11.74***
biweekly (0.1414)
Australia INS 1.2679 3.854*** 0.91.87 718.00***
10 Year Treasury 2/85-2/87 1 Mn (0.0695) 3.078*** 5.76***
Bonds weekly (0.0870)
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using GMM under the assumption of
homoskedasticity and also allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.
*,, represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.TABLE 3
Coonents of The Failure of The
zpectations Hypothesis
(1) (2) (3)
InstrientDate SetForecast Cconent Coonent Regression










3Month 1969-1986 3Mns -0.338 0.603 0.059
TBill quarterly
GM
3 Month 1969-1978 3 Mns —0.016 0.557 0.427
Euro S quarterly
GM
12 Month 1969-1986 3 Mns -0.336 0.373 0.291
T Bill quarterly
GM




30 Year 1969-1986 3 tins -0.192 0.051 0.757
Nortaaaesquarterly
GM
3Month' 1969-1986 6 tins -0.275 1.086 -0.360
T Bill quarterly
GN
12 Month 1969-1986 6 tins -0.619 0.503 -0.122
T Bill quarterly
GM




30 Year 1969-1986 6 tins —0.389 0.042. 0.568
Mortoagesquarterly
'InS
3 Month 1/83-10/84 3 tins -1.246 0.684 -0.930
Euro $ biweekly
3 Month 1/83-10/84 3 tins 0.182 0.744 0.438
Euro Dli biweekly
3 Month NtiS
1/83-10/84 3 tins 1.355 0.797 1.558
Pounds biweekly
3Month 'INS
1/83-10/84 3 tins 0.125 0.612 0.512
biweekly
10 Year tInS
Australian 7/85-2/82 1 tin 0.326 0.058 1.268
Govt. Bond weeklyTable 4a














3 Month 1969-1986 3tIns 0.3974_5.958*** 0.57150.66 .31 67 23.29***
T Sill quarterly (0.1011) _3.302*** (0.2946) 13.83***
(0.1825) (0.3443)
3 Month 1969-1978 3 tIns 0.4428_3.968*** NA 0.57 .28 33 34.23***
Euro Dollar quarterly (0.1404) _4•954*** 18.70***
(0.1118)
12Month1969-1986 3 tIns 0.6273_3.203*** 0.07730.47 .44 67 20.01***
TSill quarterly (0.1164) _2.603*** (0.2583) 16.12***
(0.1432) (0.3102)
BuyerBond 1969-1986 3 tIns 1.0100 0.364 -0.00241.01 .98 670.76
Index quarterly (0.0276)0.350 (0.0463) 3.64**
(0.0287) (0.0327)
30 Year 1969-1986 3 tIns 0.9493-1.541 -0.12880.64 .95678.88***
Mortgagesquarterly (0.0329) -1.636 (0.0565) 48.27***
(0.0310) (0.0346)
3 Month 1969-1986 6 tIns -0.0858_8.337*** -0.72071.00 .11 67 72.83***
T Bill quarterly (0.1302) _6.730*** (0.2856) 97.12***
(0.1613) (0.3189)
12 Month 1969-1986 6 tIns 0.4974_4.00l*** -0.12430.56 .26 67 24.12***
T Bill quarterly (0.1256) _3•499***(0.3041) 22.97***
(0.1437) (0.2149)
BuyerBond1969-1986 6 tIns 1.03160.895 0.01980.68 .97671.04
Index quarterly (0.0353) 1.096 (0.0575) 9.83***
(0.0288) (0.0303)
30 Year 1969-1986 6 tIns 0.9576-0.874 -0.19250.60 .90 67 8.69***
Mortgagesquarterly (0.0485) -0.869 (0.0807) 23.76***
(0.0488) (0.0597)
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using GIQIunder theassumption of
bosnoskedasticityand alsoallowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.
representsignificance at the 10. 5and1 percent levels, respectively.?*LP 4b
Tests of the MpectationsHypothesisin Various Countries
ØLSReqresioris of
(i:)e











lOIS 0.3165_9.083*** 0.97.27 45378.28***
3Month Euro $ 1/83-10/84 3 Mns (0.0752) _13.768*** 468.25***
biweekly (0.0496)
West Germany MillS 0.2562 _7.392*** 1.87.11 45154.80***
3 Month Euro Din 1/83-10/84 3 Mns (0.1006)_7.396*** 810.54***
biweekly (0.1006)
England fIlMS 0.2031_11.198*** 1.19.13 45 89.66***
3 Month Euro Pound 1/83-10/84 3 Mns (0.0712) _16.421*** 201.51***
biweekly (0.0484)
Japan POllS 0.3876 _4•955*** 1.63.16 45 58.19***
3 Month Euro Yen 1/83-10/84 3 lOis (0.1236)_4.374*** 58.26***
biweekly (0.1400)
Australia lOIS 0.9419 _3.928*** 1.88.99 71 8.31***
10 Year Treasury 2/85-2/87 1 Mn (0.0148)_3.003*** 5.05*
Bonds weekly (0.0194)
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using GMM under the assumption of
homoskedasticity and also allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.
representsignificance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.Table Sa
Testsof Excessive Forecast Volatility in theU.S. TerR Structure
OLSRegressions of






Instrent Goldith-Horizc5 t R DF
(k-j) Kagan Dates(j) 30
3Month 1969-1986 3 Mns -0.6380_1.718* -2.2337 2.22 .08 67 2.62*
T Bill quarterly (0.3715) _2.478**(0.8130) 2.31*
(0.2575) (1.8396)
3 Month 1969-1978 3 Mns -0.0476-0.130 NA 1.84 .00 33 0.60
Euro Dollar quarterly (0.3675) -0.070 0.34
(0.6820)
12 Month 1969-1986 3 PIns -0.5324_3.025*** 1.84752.35 .23 67 7.48***
T Bill quarterly (0.1760) _2.610** (0.3968) 3.28**
(0.2040) (0.7746)
Buyer Bond 1969-1986 3 Mns -0.1958_3.916*** 0.16562.23 .16 67 5.48***
Index quarterly (0.0500) _3•954*** (0.0978) 5.26***
(0.0495) (0.2133)
30 Year 1969-1986 3 PIns -0.2513_3•545***0.73662.43 .29 67 11.15
Mortaagesquarterly (0.0708) _2.305** (0.1540) 594***
(0.1090) (0.2275)
3 Month 1969-1986 6 PIns -0.3188-0.861 0.64121.41 .00 66 0.44
TBill quarterly (0.3701) -1.194 (0.6564) 0.63
(0.2671) (0.6252)
12Month1969-1986 6PIns -0.5517_2.163**1.36491.26 .10 66 2.91**
T Bill quarterly (0.2550) _2.594** (0.4846) 10.28***
(0.2127) (0.3197)
Buyer Bond 1969-1986 6 PIns -0.3967_5.702*** 0.25261.32 .36 66 11.46*
Index quarterly (0.0696) _5•335***(0.1281) 14.22***
30 Year (0.0743) (0.0982)
Bonde
30 Year 1969-1986 6 PIns -0.4876_5•399*** 0.82831.49 .38 66j3.93***
ortçzaaesquarterly (0.0903) _4.930*** (0.2023) 67.71***
(0.0989) (0.0696)
Notes: Standarderrors(in parentheses) are computed using GMMunder theasstaimption of
homnoskedasticity and also allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.



































Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using GP*1 under the assumption of
homoskedasticity and also allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.







.k-j e - Ik-je =53 + 3








































































1.73 .06 66 1.91
0.84
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using GMM under the assumption of
homoskedasticity and also allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.
representsignificance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.




















Buyer Bond1969-1986 3 tIns -0.1759 0.1600 2.11.12674.05**
Index quarterly (0.0526) (0.1029) 3.87**
(0.0524) (0.2156)



































30 Year 1969-1986 6tIns
MortgagesquarterlyThBLE 6b
1!ests of Rational !,ectations in The


























Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using G1'IN under the assumption of
homoskedasticity and also allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity, respectively.

























































Coonentain The Slape ofThe
TernStructure
Beanof:
Instrent Date SetForecast (1) (2) (3) (4)
DurationDates Horizon fJ.k-_jJ 1k-j e.j 8j,k-j —
(iD)e
k-j
(k-j) (j) Spread Expected Forward Holding
Change Premium Premium
ON
3Month 1969-1986 3 Mns 0.4346 -0.0654 0.5000 0.5000
T Bill quarterly
GN
3Month 1969-1978 3 Mns 0.6077 —0.3001 0.9078 0.9078
Euro S quarterly
ON
12 Month1969-19863 Mns 1.0662 0.1875 0.8787 3.5148
T Bill quarterly
ON




30Year 1969-19863 Mns 3.2633 3.0182 0.2451 8.9050
Mortaaaes quarterly
ON
3Nonth 1969—19866 Mns 1.0837 —0.2582 1.3419 0.6710
IBillquarterly
ON
12 Month1969-19866 Mns 1.0954 0.0193 1.0761 2.1522
I Bill quarterly
GN
Buyer 1969-19866 Mns —0.3172 —0.3877 0.0705 1.4108 nd quarterly
Indan
GN
30Year 1969—19866 Mns 3.1280 2.7590 0.3690 6.5193
Mortoaaes quarterly
3 Month 1/83—10/843Mns 0.5294 —0.1063 0.6357 0.6357
EuroS biweekly
3 Month 1/83—10/84 3 PIns 0.4179 -0.0589 0.4789 0.4789
Euro DPI biweekly
3 Month NMS
1/83-10/84 3 PIns 0.1553 —0.0410 0.1963 0.1963
Pounds biweekly
3 Month PIllS
gQ 1/83-10/843 PIns 0.0358 —0.1433 0.1791 0.1791
Xen biweekly
10 Year 1Q15
Australian7/85—2/821 Mn -3.1929 —3.2290 0.0361 2.4187
Govt. Bondweekly










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the Term Premi
Variance of:
Instrent Date Set Forecast (1) (2)









































































































































Notes: Figures above are the estimated variances obtained by projecting the survey
term premium andrealizedexcess returns, respectively, onto a constant and the
appropriate long and short rates. Estimates are annualized variances, expressed
in percent. In parenthesis are the probability values from joint F-tests that the
variances are zero.